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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
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transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
I. CHINA’S ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN LIBYA BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR.
It is a truism that a state’s economic interests in other countries will deeply aect that state’s 
foreign policy, political as well as economic. A comprehensive understanding of China’s 
reaction during and after Libya’s civil war requires an exploration of China’s economic 
relations with Libya before the war broke out in 2011.
In 1978, when China and Libya rst established formal diplomatic relations, they signed two 
economic agreements – a bilateral trade agreement and a cooperative agreement on science 
and technology, – which entered into force in 1982 (Liang De, 1993). In addition to these 
agreements, the two countries formed a working mechanism at the same time, the 
Libya-China Joint Committee, which enabled, for example, the successful convening of 
several top level workshops on economic and technological cooperation.
Based upon these institutional arrangements and economic linkages, trade and nancial 
relations developed quite rapidly. In 1992, due to the fallout from the Lockerbie Aerial 
Incident, Libya was strongly motivated to strengthen trade relations with China to 
counteract the sanctions imposed by the UN. As a result China-Libya trade volume reached 
a historical peak of US$175 billion in that year. Yet after 1994 the volume declined – (for 
example, it was only US$77.37 billion in 2000) – because of the negative eect of the 
sanctions on Libya which had begun to subvert China-Libya trade, while at the same time the 
price of crude oil also fell. At that point oil was the principal good in the Libya-to-China 
trade ow. By 2007 this situation had been reversed, with bilateral trade volume reaching an 
unprecedented US$2.4 billion, and doubling to US$5.17 billion as at 2009. China had 
become a very important trade partner of Libya, with mechanical and electrical equipment, 
construction machinery, telecommunication equipment, textiles and consumer goods being 
the main exports from China to Libya, while mainly crude oil was exported from Libya to 
China (Xinhua News, 2001).
Besides ocial trade relations, beginning in 1981 Chinese enterprises have tentatively 
penetrated the Libyan market, especially in the eld of construction. Nevertheless, compared 
to the volume of trade, Chinese investment in Libya in 1980s was not that signicant. After 
2000, however, Chinese investment began to expand in two elds – energy and contract 
works. All three of China’s state-owned oil companies – CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC – 
have done business in Libya since then. For instance, not only CNPC but also CNOOC had 
subsidiaries in Libya. e Pipeline Bureau of CNPC had been undertaking oil and gas 
pipeline projects since 2002, while the International Engineer Company of CNOOC was in 
charge of related business in one Libyan oil eld after winning a bid in 2005.
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
REFERENCES
Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011, e Ministry of Foreign Aairs on the multinational 
military strike against Libya. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/xwfb/2011-03/20/content_1828038.htm>, [Accessed 20 May 2015].
Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011, China recognises Libya’s “National Transitional Council”. Available at: 
<http://news.163.com/11/0912/21/7DPJ222V00014JB5.html> [Accessed 9 September 2015].
Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012, e Commerce Department stated there are short-term diculties for Chinese companies 
in completing their return to Libya. Available at: <http://www.focac.org/chn/zxxx/t903234.htm> [Accessed 9 February 2015].
Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012, China’s role in Africa’s diversied economy, (FOCAC). Available at: 
<http://www.focac.org/chn/zfgx/zfgxjmhz/t906442.htm> [Accessed 20 February 2015]. 
Ge Chong, 2011, “China should not be neglected in Libya’s post-war reconstruction”, Wen Wei Post (Hong Kong), 14 September.
International Business Daily, 2012, “Business group of Chinese Commercial Department visited Libya”, 3 February.
Jian Junbo, 2011, “China treads new path in Libya”, Asia Times Online, 17 June. Available at: 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF17Ad01.html>.
Jiao Xiang, 2012, “Chinese companies expect to participate in the reconstruction of Libya and deepen economic and trade 
cooperation”, People’s Daily, 4 February.
Li Zhi, 2011, “China’s role in Libya reconstruction?” Elite Reference, 31 August.
Liang De (ed.), 1993, “A List of Treaties, Agreements, Contracts and Protocols between China and Foreign Countries”, in e 
Great Dictionary of the Republic’s Achievements, Beijing Hongqi Press. Available at: 
<http://gongjushu.oversea.cnki.net/oversea/ShowDetail.aspx?Table=CRFDOTHERINFO&ShowField=Content&TitleField=Tit
le-ShowTitle&Field=OTHERID&Value=R20060729900A000016> [Accessed 9 October 2015].
Peng Liguo, 2011, “Secret war on Libya oil”, Southern Weekly, 12 September. Available at: 
<http://www.infzm.com/content/62985>. 
People’s Daily, 2011a, “Libya re-attacked by Western multinational troops, armed action toward Libya accused by the Arab 
League”, 24 March.
People’s Daily, 2011b, “Treat China’s participation in Libya’s post-war reconstruction normally”, Available at: 
<http://news.163.com/11/0916/06/7E28QEAJ00014JB6.html> [Accessed 16 September 2015].
Securities Times, 2011, “Chinese investment in Libya aected, 65.7 million yuan of COSL lost”, 24 August. 
Sohu, Inc., 2011, List of Chinese Investments in Libya, Available at: <http://business.sohu.com/20110823/n317112596.shtml> 
[Accessed 23 August 2015]. 
Xinhua News, 2001, “China-Libya trade and economic relations”. Available at: 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/20010523/583331.htm> [Accessed 23 June 2015].
Xinhua News, 2011, “Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi telephoned Secretary General of the UN Ban Ki-Moon”. Available at: 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-08/23/c_121900924.htm> [Accessed 23 August 2015].
ABOUT THE AUTHORS.
Jian Junbo.
Associate Professor, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University.
jianjunbo@fudan.edu.cn
Álvaro Méndez.
Research Fellow at the London School of Economics.
Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Regent’s University London.
a.mendez@lse.ac.uk
mendeza@regents.ac.uk
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
Working Paper No. 5. 2015.
5
projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
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the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
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Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
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Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
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Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
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Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
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Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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projects-resumption that the new regime imposed, according to which Chinese enterprises 
may resume, but unconditionally, implying that they would receive no compensation 
(Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2012). 
In reality, only a few companies like Huawei and ZTE, two private giants in the Chinese 
telecom market, resumed business operations in Libya; many others, especially in 
construction engineering, are still in suspension. A few teams consisting of technologists, 
agents and managers, but not workers have returned Libya to undertake preparatory work for 
future business. e China Communications Construction Company Limited, for example, 
involved in ve projects in Libya before the civil war, has been sending preparatory teams 
since October 2011 (Jiao Xiang, 2012).
In sum, after the end of the civil war, it was not clear that Chinese enterprises could 
successfully return to Libya, resume their contract projects and start new investments. is 
indicates that at that time China didn’t have a robust capability to protect its economic 
interests in Libya.
II. THE ALTERATION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.
China’s foreign policy towards Libya during the changing circumstances both internationally 
and domestically experienced three major shifts, from neutrality at the beginning, a hedging 
strategy through contact with the Libyan rebels and nally a formal recognition of the NTC.
II.1. China maintained its neutrality at the beginning of the civil war.
When civil war in Libya broke out, Beijing maintained its neutrality: it neither followed the 
West in bombing troops loyal to Gadda nor supported the Tripoli regime. It stood by, 
uttering platitudes through spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.
In the template of Chinese foreign policy one basic principle is non-interference, based on 
the UN Charter’s support for the sovereign independence of all member states. In Beijing’s 
opinion, the civil war between the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels should allow no 
intervention by foreign powers without UN authorisation, and should be resolved mainly by 
the Libyan people, as Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly declared.
Neutrality gave rise to Beijing’s usual position toward conicting parties – treating both sides 
equally. is is veried in the case of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Chinese 
Red Cross. On 19 August China delivered humanitarian supplies, including rice, oil and 
medicines, to Benghazi Airport for provision to the rebels. Ma Jianchun, Counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Egypt, who was in charge of these transfers to Libya, said at the airport 
that there was no political intention to deliver the supplies to either the western or the eastern 
fronts in Benghazi, and that similar humanitarian supplies would also be delivered to Tripoli 
shortly. According to him, both the Tripoli regime and the Benghazi rebels would receive 
humanitarian aid from China.
From the beginning of the crisis but before it ended, the Chinese government took a neutral 
stance, adhering to its basic principle in international relations – non-interference; 
meanwhile undertaking responsibility for humanitarian aid.
II.2. Neutrality was hedged by contact with the rebels.
Neutrality in Libya’s crisis was subtly altered as the NATO-supported rebels gained more and 
more ground on the battleeld. In principle, Tripoli was the sole legitimate authority in Libya 
when the civil war broke out, as far as Beijing was concerned, since it was still admitted by 
the UN and, in fact, China did maintain its formal relations with it. But as the collapse of 
Gadda’s rule become more ineluctable, Beijing began to put out feelers to the rebels.
On June 8 in Beijing, for example, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Abdelati Obeidi, 
Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International 
Cooperation of Libya, who also acted as the Tripoli regime’s special envoy to China, in order 
to “discuss the current situation in Libya and exchange views on the resolution of the crisis”.
On the next day, however, Chen Xiaodong, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Northwest 
Asia and Africa Division, said in an interview by the Chinese media that China intended to 
keep in contact with the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council of Libya. To this end, 
Beijing would invite representatives of the rebels to China, Chen said. Moreover, he stressed 
that to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, China had intensied its eorts to 
bring all parties in the conict into dialogue. 
Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, even before the Tripoli delegation’s 
visit to Beijing, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar Zhang Zhiliang had met with Mustafa Abdel 
When the civil war broke out in earnest in March 2011, the Chinese government had already 
begun evacuating in late February the 36,000 Chinese workers, managers and private 
businessmen then in Libya, an operation that was complete by early March. is meant that 
all signed contract projects had had to be stopped, or at least postponed, due to the domestic 
unrest in Libya.
Undoubtedly, Chinese enterprises were seriously damaged by this conict and by the 
suspension of business, but above all, by the loss of xed assets. Although most Chinese 
companies were not directly invested in Libya, they had many xed assets there, such as 
headquarters for research and business operations, infrastructure dedicated to contract 
projects, and in-country materials and equipment. All of them slipped from the control of 
Chinese companies during the civil conict.
In addition, earned prots and pre-paid costs for projects were not compensated in this 
political crisis. In addition, Chinese enterprises and government were obliged to deal with the 
predictable dislocations that happen when one’s contract projects are put on hold. For 
example, labourers’ return ights had to be re-arranged, and their re-employment resolved. 
Moreover, enterprises were sometimes confronted with unfair claims by Libyans. For 
instance, Libya Sahara Bank sued Gezhouba Corporation, the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Construction Corporation, Hongfu Construction Engineering Company, etc. 
for unmerited recovery (Sohu, Inc., 2011).
In September 2011 Beijing became the last member of UNSC to recognise the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate authority in Libya in the post-Gadda era. 
Soon after, the NTC promised to recognise the validity of all contracts signed between China 
and the Gadda regime. China also sent diplomats to Paris to attend “e Friends of Libya” 
– to help Libya reconstruct after the civil war.
After discussions between the new regime and Beijing between 4 and 8 February 2012, a 
Chinese working group consisting of the Ministry of Commerce, the International 
Contractors Association, and those enterprises with large investments in Libya visited Libya 
to survey the damage to their assets and to discuss with the new authorities their possible 
return to Libya (International Business Daily, 2012). Unfortunately, except for a few cases it 
has been far from clear that Chinese enterprises can seamlessly re-enter Libya, owing to their 
divergent political views about the Gadda regime as well as to the terms for 
Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small 
compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in 
Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex 
Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas 
operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the 
civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), 
Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), 
Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major 
markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at 
2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 
percent (Peng Liguo, 2011).
Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested 
in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power 
stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications 
plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), 
Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas 
contract works projects.
In 2009 alone 406 new contracts valued at US$5.841 billion were signed between Chinese 
companies and Libya, and 24,000 Chinese labourers were working in Libya by the end of 
that year. Amongst the larger projects were the coastal railway line extension by the China 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the Saika Ha and Braque university campuses 
by Hubei Province’s Industrial Construction Group Co., Ltd, and the 
transformation-of-old-cities project by Gezhouba Group Co., Ltd. Additionally, some 
world-renowned private enterprises, such as ZTE and Huawei, were also invested in Libya, 
especially in the telecommunications eld.
us, by 2009 China’s Ministry of Commerce could estimated that Chinese capital 
investment in Libya amounted to US$426.9 billion. By March 2011, when the civil war 
broke out, a total of 75 Chinese enterprises, including 13 central government-owned/-operated 
companies, were invested in Libya and involved in 50 contract works projects valued at about 
US$18.8 billion and employing 36,000 Chinese labourers (Securities Times, 2011).
However, the importance for China of its investment in Libya should not be overestimated, 
as the amounts in question hardly stand out in comparison with its investments in other 
African countries, let alone the amount of Western investment in Libya. According to China’s 
Commerce Ministry, the African countries receiving the most Chinese investment in 2010 
were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, South Africa and Angola. Libya was 
less important than all of these (Diao Xiaoqiong, 2012). Furthermore, most Chinese 
enterprises in Libya had no direct investment in the country. Chen Deming, then Minister 
of China’s Commerce Ministry, remarked that China hadn’t a penny (directly) invested in 
Libya before the civil war. is was conrmed by Ministry spokespersons, who stated that 
Chinese enterprises were not involved in FDI in Libya, except for contract works projects.
Chinese companies’ investment in Libya pre-civil war.
When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an 
ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the 
sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that 
China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be 
forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy 
until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been 
forthcoming.
In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, 
Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s 
important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also 
conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China 
signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN 
Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to 
hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese 
Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011).
e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war 
period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would 
play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year 
rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the 
other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts 
with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at 
hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime.
One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the 
civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a 
subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing 
with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s 
interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to 
release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather 
belatedly in the NTC’s eyes.
III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION.
A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences 
with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war 
accelerated. 
III.1. China’s interaction with the West.
China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone 
as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while 
opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 
1973).
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed 
attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international 
relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related 
international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led 
air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In 
Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others 
to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective 
the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the 
non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. 
Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original 
objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to 
armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve 
consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. 
After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the 
AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all 
chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU 
conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind 
of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e 
African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking 
the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military 
action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military 
strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the 
Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air 
strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and 
joined the strike action. 
irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news 
for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and 
China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign 
armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. 
Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 
by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the 
Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member 
of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure.
Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. 
When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the 
air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu 
added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya 
when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one 
Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya.
Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial 
measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some 
international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to 
try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the 
West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric.
As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the 
Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the 
post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political 
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Jalil, the Chairman of the Benghazi Transitional Council. And Li Lianhe, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Egypt, visited Benghazi ostensibly “to learn 
about the humanitarian situation and the fate of Chinese state-companies there”; at the same 
time, however, he was making contact with leaders of the Transitional Council (Jian Junbo, 
2011).
e analysis must be that, while the civil war was ongoing, Beijing acted conservatively, 
treating Tripoli as the legitimate regime of all Libya; and yet, as the fortunes of war turned, 
Beijing started to prepare for the coming to power of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC). By the end, it had quietly altered its neutral stance in favour of a hedging policy that 
clearly crossed over its own red line – non-interference in a sovereign state’s internal aairs.
is alteration is absolutely consistent with China’s intention to safeguard its national 
interests. Neutrality was good policy while the civil war was ongoing and unresolved, because 
all Chinese in Libya had left for China through Chinese government-supported air transport 
before hostilities were well under way. A limited war would not have signicantly aected 
China’s interests in Libya. If Gadda won, China’s interests would be secure, as China would 
not have followed the West in supporting the rebels against him. Neutrality implied 
reciprocal good will from Gadda if he defeated the rebels. Yet as the war escalated and the 
rebels’ victories threatened the destruction of Gadda’s rule, it became clear that neutrality 
would not suce to preserve China’s interests in Libya, given the number of incomplete 
construction projects left in Libya and the possibility if winning a share of the reconstruction 
contracts after the end of the war. If the new owners of Libya took an unfriendly stance 
toward China or even punished China for its coolness toward the NTC during the war, the 
value of China’s construction projects might be lost if the rebels refused to recognize their 
legal validity of the contracts signed with the Gadda regime. Accordingly, a hedging stance 
in lieu of its obsolete neutrality was adopted by Beijing to protect China’s interests in tandem 
with changes in the battleeld situation.
II.3. e alteration of China’s attitude toward the NTC.
e hedging policy did not mean the NTC was to be recognized immediately by Beijing as 
the single legitimate regime of Libya. What it did mean was that Beijing preferred a exible 
approach to any oblique involvement in Libya’s civil war.
transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and 
geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan 
people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people 
decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the 
AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help 
Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes.
In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 
West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s 
situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition.
III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations.
China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a 
no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis. According to Beijing’s 
explanations, abstention indicated that China agreed to the implementation of UN-led 
peacekeeping in Libya, but hoped to coordinate its position with the AU and the Arab 
League, which had important authority to deal with the crisis.
From the rst stages of the crisis, then, China maintained its position with the UN, the AU 
and the Arab League. Since UNSC Resolution 1973 did not violate the non-interference 
principle and, most importantly, was advocated by the UN and agreed by the AU and Arab 
League, Beijing had no reason to veto it.
Once the civil war was in full tilt, and the AU and the Arab League were attempting to act as 
mediators between Tripoli and Benghazi, Beijing expressed respect for the AU and Arab 
League: its spokesperson said all involved conicting parties should seriously heed the AU’s 
suggestions and plans, its roadmap to peace in particular.
As the war drew to a close, the AU at its conference on the Libyan question, held in South 
Africa on 14 September, called for Libya to set up an inclusive government as soon as 
possible, outlining concrete approaches to realising it. On the next day, Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said China appreciated the active role that AU had played in the 
Libyan issue (People’s Daily, 2011b). Simultaneously, China appealed to all groups in Libya 
to actively concern themselves with the mediation programmes oered by the AU.
For Beijing, the United Nations was the best and most legitimate platform for putting into 
practice Libya’s reconstruction in the post-civil war era (Ge Chong, 2011). On one occasion 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said the UN should play the main role in post-war Libya. He 
also said the UN should coordinate and cooperate with the AU and Arab League in resolving 
Libya’s issues: “Not only Western powers, but also international organisations should 
participate in the reconstruction of Libya in the post-war era”, he said when telephoning Ban 
Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN (Xinhua News, 2011).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOFT ENGAGEMENT IS NEEDED FOR BEIJING.
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, non-interference has been a basic 
principle of Chinese foreign policy; however, as Chinese economic and geopolitical interests 
have proliferated in the 21st century, this principle has come to be pointedly questioned by 
some Chinese scholars and media. But, in practice, the principle has not been abandoned, 
but rather implemented with a more sophisticated approach than before. Some general 
concluding remarks can be made.
IV.1. China has essentially stood by its non-interference principle in the Libyan Crisis, and will do 
so in future.
In general, and taking into account the whole story of Beijing’s engagement in the Libya 
Crisis, it may be concluded that China has not derogated from the non-interference 
principle, although it sometimes adopted a hedging policy.
At the beginning of the war, China by abstaining kept silent on, if it did not indeed support 
UNSC Resolution 1973. is meant that China respected the UN decision for a no-y zone, 
as this was not an armed intervention but a peacekeeping measure. When the NATO-led 
strikes surprised it, China expressed opposition, which was the same as insisting on the 
non-interference principle. 
In the mid-stage of the civil war, China felt obliged to abandon strict neutrality in favour of 
a hedging policy: it became deeply engaged in the domestic aairs of Libya by contacting the 
rebels, even though they were not recognised as legitimate by Beijing at the time. is meant 
it wanted to inuence the progress of the civil war, though the inuence was weak and 
indirect. In any case, a hedging policy is not the same thing as intervention: it was done by 
peaceful means, without bias toward any side in the conict, much like a mediator.
After the war ended, China believed the main actor in Libya’s reconstruction should be the 
UN, which meant China wanted the post-war resolution of Libya’s crisis to be based on 
international legitimacy after things had gone o this “right” track. Of course, this also 
implies that Beijing hoped the reconstruction of Libya, if carried out not only by the Western 
powers but also by the UN, would benet China upon its return to the country.
Generally speaking, China’s engagement in the Libyan crisis was based on the 
non-interference principle except for a hesitant hedging policy. To some extent Beijing 
punished itself by sticking to its principles, because the rebels’ criticism put much pressure on 
it during the war as well as post-war, owing to the Western military victory. Be all that as it 
may, China has generally insisted on the independence and sovereignty of Libya.
IV.2. e diculty of adhering to China’s traditional non-interference policy in all cases, 
considering the global expansion of its interests and responsibilities.
As in the Libyan case, so also, practically, in other recent cases like the Darfur Crisis or the 
Syrian civil war, China nds it much harder to adhere punctiliously to the non-interference 
principle, in countries and regions of unrest especially, now that its economic and geopolitical 
interests have expanded in the world more than before.
Beijing has tried to keep its promises to respect the non-interference principle, but the 
occasional contacts with the Benghazi-based rebels reected Beijing’s awkward choice 
between adherence to and violation of this principle in certain atypical cases. e hedging 
policy is Beijing’s balancing of its conicting self-interests, to be used in countries torn by 
warring factions. In order to keep its original contracts with the Tripoli regime in eect 
during and after the war, and also to share a slice of the post-war reconstruction cake, Beijing 
had to hedge its bets by corresponding with the rebels. Although its engagement in Libya’s 
civil war was low-key and had no direct eect on the progress of the conict, contact with the 
NTC nonetheless violated the usual Chinese practice of non-interference, especially given 
that the Gadda regime still held a seat in the UN and had an embassy in Beijing. It will be 
dicult for Beijing to reconcile the protection of its overseas economic and geopolitical 
interests with strict adherence to non-interference.
IV.3. Soft involvement in foreign states’ internal aairs is increasingly unavoidable.
One possible resolution to the diculty of balancing protection of national interests overseas 
with adherence to non-interference is for China to take a exible and smart approach to 
engagement in the internal aairs of interdependent countries and regions. To deal with its 
dilemma in conicted regions, soft engagement through constructive and peaceful 
approaches without armed intervention is a likelier choice for Beijing. China is increasingly 
inclined to play the mediator and coordinator role during an international crisis, not merely 
afterwards.
is paper concludes that crisis management ought to be based on three principles: 1) a 
pacic approach; 2) the bi- or multi-laterality of contacts; and 3) the goal of stabilising 
conicted countries and regions. Following these precepts, soft engagement by China should 
dier from Western-style intervention in several important dimensions: 1) Soft engagement 
is based on peaceful, defensive, and diplomatic means; while intervention is oensive, even 
an armed threat toward or invasion of a sovereign state. 2) Soft engagement is always a 
hedging or balancing policy, rather than a one-sided policy, as the West used in Libya – 
meaning that soft engagement should practise to avoid directly aecting the course of 
internal aairs, or to aect them minimally; whereas intervention is an action intended to 
drastically aect other countries’ internal aairs, viz. regime change. 3) Soft engagement 
should be pursued, if at all possible, under the umbrella of the UN or some other 
multi-lateral organisation; in contrast to intervention, which is unilateral or, if pursued under 
colour of the UN, then without its bona de authority. 4) Soft engagement must stabilise the 
country or region that has fallen into crisis, or at least endeavour to conserve the status quo 
and prevent the situation from deteriorating further; whereas, intervention is aimed at 
transforming the status quo.
In the sense of the foregoing comparison, soft engagement in lieu of intervention is one 
possible approach Beijing could take to protect its overseas interests in future, while at the 
same time avoiding signicant or conspicuous violations of the non-interference principle.
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